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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The district court had jurisdiction under  28 U.S.C. § 1331 as the case arises 
under the Fourth Amendment,  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  The district court 
dismissed the amended complaint on February 26, 2013.  On March 27, 2013, the 
Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.  This Court has jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether federal immigration officers are entitled to qualified 
immunity for violating American citizens’ clearly established Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from unreasonable seizures by (1) arresting and interrogating them 
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, respectively, and again by
(2) continuing to detain them for several hours after the officers confirmed their 
citizenship.  Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 8 at 21-27; Pls.’ Resp. in Opp’n to 
Defs.’Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 9 at 14-19; Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ 
Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 12 at 7-10; JA11-14. 
2. Whether the district court erred in granting the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss the amended complaint because the plaintiffs did not plead that all 
defendants personally participated in the ultimate conduct rather than recognizing a 
supervisor can be liable for the acts of his subordinates if he directed others to 
violate a plaintiff’s rights or had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ 
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violations.  Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 8 at 14-20; Pls.’ Resp. in Opp’n to 
Defs.’Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 9 at 8-13; Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. 
to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 12 at 2-4; JA7-11. 
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES AND PROCEEDINGS 
This case was originally before the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania as Case No. 2:12-cv-03599.  There are no related 
cases.  
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff appellants (the “Drivers”) are three U.S. citizens who were 
seized, detained, handcuffed, thrown against the walls at gunpoint, and held for 
hours as alleged illegal aliens based solely on the facts that they drove taxis and the 
defendant appellees (the “ICE Agents”) did not use readily available information to 
determine their citizenship.   
The ICE Agents are special agents employed by the United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), which is a division of the United 
States Department of Homeland Security.  After initially contacting the 
Philadelphia Parking Authority (the “Parking Authority”) in June 2009, the ICE 
Agents collaborated with the Parking Authority over the course of the next year 
and exchanged various versions of a list of possible illegal aliens working as taxi 
and limousine drivers.   
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At the conclusion of these efforts, however, the Drivers still remained on the 
list because the ICE Agents and their subordinates purportedly were unable to 
confirm the Drivers’ citizenship status.  But the ICE Agents and their subordinates’ 
failure to identify this information was inherently unreasonable, given the fact that 
all of the information they used to verify the Drivers’ citizenship after arresting 
them, such as their social security numbers and driver’s license information, was 
already part of the Parking Authority’s records.   
Thus, the Drivers’ arrest and interrogation violated their right to be free from 
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and cannot be justified by the 
authority granted to immigration officials under  8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(a)(1)-(a)(2) to 
interrogate and arrest suspected aliens.  Statutes cannot qualify the Constitution’s 
floor when it comes to protection of individual liberty, and thus the belief must be 
based on either probable cause or reasonable suspicion.   
Here, however, the ICE Agents and their subordinates had neither probable 
cause nor reasonable suspicion to justify their seizure of the Drivers where their 
justification was grounded in their own unreasonable failure to confirm the 
Drivers’ citizenship.  For government officials are not immune from liability 
because of their own willful and indifferent ignorance.  Accordingly, the ICE 
Agents were not entitled to qualified immunity. 
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Moreover, despite confirming the Drivers’ citizenship to their own 
satisfaction and knowing that they mistakenly included the Drivers on the 
interrogation list, rather than release the Drivers, the ICE Agents again violated 
their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure by continuing 
to detain them for several hours.  The ICE Agents’ justified this continued 
detention because of a baseless suspicion that the Drivers might “tip-off” the few 
outstanding taxi drivers who had not appeared yet.  Despite the district court’s 
finding otherwise, this prolonged and continued detention was an unreasonable 
seizure, completely unsupported by reasonable suspicion.  No reasonably 
competent ICE agent could view such conduct as lawful.  Accordingly, such an 
unreasonable detention does not fall within the ambit of qualified immunity.    
The power of ICE agents to interrogate and arrest suspected illegal aliens 
must comport with the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee that all people shall have 
the right to be secure in their persons against unreasonable seizures.  Otherwise, 
they must be held accountable without allowing them to avoid responsibility by 
cloaking themselves in qualified immunity. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 26, 2012, plaintiff appellants filed a complaint against defendant 
appellees for Bivens claims, alleging that defendant appellees’ gross negligence 
and deliberate indifference violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from 
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unreasonable seizure by arresting them without probable cause, by refusing to 
release them once they learned they were U.S. citizens, and by failing to release 
them once their citizenship was determined.  Plaintiff appellants also asserted that 
defendants appellees’ failure to ensure that no United States citizens’ name was on 
the working list, and their mistakenly including the plaintiff appellants on the 
working list, constituted outrageous and conscience shocking governmental 
conduct violative of their liberty and due process rights under the Fifth 
Amendment.  Plaintiff appellants sought compensatory and punitive damages.  On 
October 2, 2012 the defendant appellees filed their first motion to dismiss or, in the 
alternative, motion for summary.  In response, on October 23, 2012, the plaintiff 
appellants filed their first amended complaint.   
On November 6, 2012, the defendant appellees moved to dismiss the 
amended complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, asserting that the 
allegations contained in the amended complaint failed to state viable Bivens 
claims, and that each defendant appellee was entitled to qualified immunity.  They 
also argued that plaintiff appellants’ Fifth Amendment claims should be dismissed 
because they are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.
On November 27, 2012, the plaintiff appellants filed their response in 
opposition to the defendant appellees motion to dismiss.  After having their motion 
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to file a reply granted by the district court on December 5, 2012, the defendant 
appellees filed their reply that same day.
On February 26, 2013, the district court granted the defendant appellees’ 
motion to dismiss.  The court held the plaintiff appellants failed to sufficiently 
plead their Bivens claim because they did not identify each specific action the 
defendant appellees took leading to the alleged misconduct, despite the defendant 
appellees’ direct and supervisory participation in the operation that resulted in 
plaintiff appellants’ arrests and detentions.  The district court also held the 
defendant appellees’ actions were protected by qualified immunity, reasoning that 
a reasonable agent would believe that the defendant appellees’ conduct in 
including plaintiff appellants on the interrogation list of suspected non-citizens, 
luring them to the Parking Authority Headquarters, arresting them, interrogating 
them, and continuing to detain them after acknowledging their citizenship, was 
lawful.  This appeal was timely noticed on March 28, 2013.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. McDonald Included The Drivers on the List of Suspected Illegal 
Immigrants.
 In or around June 2009, Marc McDonald contacted the Enforcement 
Manager of Parking Authority’s Taxicab and Limousine Division, to request a list 
of all taxicab drivers certified by the Parking Authority to operate a taxicab in 
Philadelphia because McDonald and Frederick Chow were assigned to verify the 
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taxi drivers’ immigration status.  JA46.  The Parking Authority provided a list of 
all certified taxicab drivers to McDonald.  JA46.  Over the next year, McDonald 
and the Parking Authority exchanged various versions of the certified operator list 
in order to identify illegal aliens or immigrants operating taxicabs in Philadelphia.  
JA46.
 When deposed in a companion case against the Parking Authority, the 
Enforcement Manager testified that the Parking Authority collects information 
about every applicant’s date of birth, social security number, and proof of 
citizenship and that Parking Authority maintained records that proved each 
plaintiff was a U.S. citizen.  See JA92-93.  Although those Parking Authority 
records were available to the ICE Agents, the Parking Authority had demonstrated 
a willingness to provide information, and the ICE Agents had over a year to 
request the documents, McDonald failed to obtain the records.  Rather, McDonald 
obtained and used only the Parking Authority’s biographical information.  See
JA73.
 McDonald instructed an ICE Intelligence Research Specialist to use the 
biographical information to check immigration and criminal history databases.  
JA73.  McDonald then narrowed the list to people who appeared to be illegal 
immigrants.  JA73-74.  As a result of McDonald’s failure to identify the Drivers as 
U.S. citizens, their names inexplicably remained on the list of people who had no 
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evidence of U.S. citizenship or of undocumented or unknown immigration status.
See JA127-29; JA73. 
 McDonald did not work alone and unsupervised—Chow, the Assistant 
Special Agent in Charge for Homeland Security Investigations in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, was McDonald’s second-line supervisor.  JA80.  As such, Chow 
reviewed and gave final approval for the plan McDonald developed. See JA80.
He was also present on site the day the plan was implemented.  See JA80.  ICE 
Agent William Riley also supervised and assisted with the plan—as Assistant 
Special Agent in Charge of the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, he supervised investigative groups focused on 
violations of immigration and custom laws.  See JA78.  Riley knew of and 
acquiesced in the plan by providing a number of agents under his control to 
participate in the operation. See JA78.  The operation to determine the drivers on 
the list was ultimately executed by the ICE Agents and twenty-two subordinate 
agents under their direction and control. See JA73-74. 
B. The ICE Agents Directed The Arrests Of The Drivers At The 
Parking Authority Facility. 
 ICE Agents directed Parking Authority to send a letter to all persons on the 
List, falsely informing each person he was entitled to a refund from Parking 
Authority in order to have drivers on the List come to Parking Authority 
headquarters.  JA67-69.
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 Each Driver complied with the letter and arrived at Parking Authority’s 
headquarters on the same day in June 2010.  JA47.  Shittu arrived at about 7:00 
AM, Bounthisane arrived at about 9:00 AM, and Lawal arrived at about 9:30 AM.
JA47, 52, 56.  Upon arrival, each Driver provided his driver’s license, taxicab ID, 
name, date of birth, address, and social security number to an ICE agent.  JA47, 52, 
56.  All of which was information the Parking Authority already had.  JA92-93.
The Drivers were then instructed to enter, separately, another room to receive their 
refunds.  Pursuant to the ICE Agents’ plan, agents wearing police-marked raid 
attire with holstered weapons violently attacked each plaintiff, threw him against a 
wall, handcuffed him, and told him he was under arrest for an immigration 
violation.  JA47, 52, 56; see JA74. 
 During each arrest, the Drivers repeatedly informed the ICE Agents and 
their subordinates that they were U.S. citizens.  JA48, 52, 57. After their arrests, 
the Drivers were removed to another room where they were detained, handcuffed, 
and interrogated for over an hour by the ICE Agents and subordinates under the 
ICE Agents’ control.  JA48, 52, 57.  During their detention, each Driver continued 
to inform the ICE Agents and subordinates that he was a U.S. citizen.  JA48, 52, 
57.
 When Lawal was arrested and detained, the ICE Agents had already 
identified Shittu and Bounthisane as U.S. citizens who had been erroneously 
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included on the List.  JA57.  Lawal repeatedly told the ICE Agents and their 
subordinates that his valid U.S. passport and certificate of citizenship were in his 
taxicab.  JA57.  The ICE Agents eventually directed a Parking Authority 
representative to search Lawal’s taxicab.  JA57.  As Lawal said, the Parking 
Authority representative found Lawal’s valid U.S. passport and certificate of 
citizenship and presented them to the ICE Agents.  JA57.  Despite proving his 
citizenship, Lawal was still not permitted to leave.  JA58. 
C. The ICE Agents Detained Lawal, Bounthisane, and Shittu Despite 
Acknowledging Their Status As U.S. Citizens.  
After each Driver had been detained more than an hour, the ICE Agents told 
them it had been a mistake.  JA48, 53, 57.  Despite acknowledging that each Driver 
was a U.S. citizen, the ICE Agents instructed their subordinates to repeatedly 
inform each plaintiff he could not leave.  JA48, 53, 58. 
The Drivers knew the people in the room were agents because the Drivers 
had just been violently arrested.  Further, about four wore uniforms, several wore 
raid attire with police markings and some had guns strapped to their waists. See
JA49, 53, 59, 74.  Several of the agents were positioned by the exit, indicating to 
each plaintiff that he was not permitted to leave.  JA49, 53, 58.  Each Driver even 
asked the ICE Agents and their subordinates whether he was permitted to leave 
Parking Authority Headquarters, and the ICE Agents said, “no—remain seated in 
the room with the other detained taxi cab drivers.”  JA49, 53, 58.  Indeed, when an 
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overwhelming number of agents with guns and badges told the Drivers they could 
not leave, the Drivers concluded this was true.  As a result, the Drivers were held 
in custody against their will for several additional hours.  JA49, 53, 58.
Although ICE Agents permitted their subordinates to offer Lawal 
refreshments during his detention, they did not allow the Drivers to speak or stand.
JA49, 53, 58.  When Shittu and Lawal attempted to speak with each other, the ICE 
Agents directed their subordinates to separate Shittu and Lawal.  JA48.  The 
Drivers were finally allowed to leave after McDonald concluded the operation.
JA76.
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court exercises plenary review of a district court’s grant of a motion to 
dismiss.   Burtch v. Millberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the pleading must 
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief,” in order to “give the Agent fair notice of what the . . . claim is 
and the ground upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 555 (2007).  To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint does not need to 
contain detailed factual allegations. Id.  A complaint only needs to contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing  Twombly, 550 
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U.S. at 570).  A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the Agent is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.  Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Drivers have alleged facts sufficient to show that the ICE Agents acted 
outside the scope of their statutory authority and violated the Drivers’ Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures where their arrests and 
interrogations were based upon the ICE Agents’ unreasonable failure to confirm 
their citizenship despite readily available evidence in the Parking Authority’s 
possession.
The initial seizures of the Drivers constituted arrests under  8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a)(2) because a reasonable person in the Drivers’ situation would believe 
they were under arrest where the ICE Agents and their subordinates repeatedly told 
them that they were being arrested for an alleged immigration violation, took their 
identification documents, displayed weapons, handcuffed them, had twenty-two 
officers present—most in raid gear, and interrogated them for over an hour.  At the 
very least, the initial seizure constituted a de facto arrest because the seizure was 
more intrusive than necessary to effectuate an interrogation.  But whether an arrest 
or a de facto arrest, the Drivers’ arrests were not based on probable cause and were 
therefore unreasonable, and in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. 
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Even if the initial seizures constituted interrogations under  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1357(a)(1), such warrantless interrogations are constrained by the Fourth 
Amendment and must be based on reasonable suspicion.  The ICE Agents, 
however, did not have reasonable suspicion that the Drivers were illegal aliens 
because they could have verified the Drivers’ citizenship using the readily 
available documentation in the Parking Authority’s possession.  Further, the vast 
resources available to ICE and the fact that the ICE Agents took over a year to 
create the interrogation list, and therefore were not operating under the stress of 
urgency to justify their negligence and lack of due diligence, demonstrates that 
there was no excuse for their failure to confirm the Drivers’ citizenship.   
Further, the seizure was not sufficiently limited in scope because rather than 
routinely question the Drivers, they orchestrated a secret interrogation that 
involved subjective intrusion in the form of fear and emotional distress and which 
lasted for several hours. 
In light of these circumstances, coupled with the well-established law as it 
existed at the time of the ICE Agents’ conduct, reasonably competent ICE agents 
would know that their conduct was unlawful—whether governed by probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion.  Accordingly, the district court erred when it held 
that the ICE Agents were entitled to qualified immunity.   
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Moreover, the Drivers have alleged sufficient facts to show that the ICE 
Agents and their subordinates again disregarded § 1357(a)(1)’s requirement that 
the seizure of a suspected alien is only justified when based on reasonable 
suspicion and violated the Drivers’ Fourth Amendment rights after they continued 
to detain the Drivers for several hours after confirming their citizenship and 
knowing that they had been mistakenly detained.  Indeed, once the ICE Agents 
confirmed the Drivers’ citizenship to their own satisfaction, no reasonable 
suspicion could exist to justify their continued detention.  Similarly, the ICE 
Agents’ stated purpose for the continued detention—that they wanted to mitigate 
any risk of the Drivers informing other taxi drivers who had not shown up yet—is 
not only an insufficient justification for their seizures, but is not based on 
reasonable suspicion as there is no evidence supporting the legitimacy of this 
concern.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence also makes clear that the continued 
detention of the Drivers squarely falls within the definition of a seizure and the 
several additional hours for which the Drivers were detained are not de minimis. 
Specifically, in addition to the prolonged detention, the ICE Agents and their 
subordinates repeatedly told the Drivers that they were not permitted to leave 
despite being wrongfully seized; refused to allow the Drivers to speak or stand; had 
twenty-two agents, many of who wore raid gear and displayed guns strapped to 
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their waists and stood by the holding room exit; and disrupted not only the daily 
lives of the Drivers, but also limited their physical movement.  Thus, a reasonable 
person in the Drivers’ position would believe that they were not free to leave, 
constituting a seizure.
Reasonably competent ICE agents would have known that this conduct both 
constituted a seizure and was unsupported by reasonable suspicion.  Accordingly, 
the ICE Agents were not entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court erred 
in so holding. 
Lastly, the district court erred in ruling that the Drivers did not plead facts 
sufficient to establish a Bivens claim.  A defendant is liable for a Bivens claim not 
only if he or she committed the ultimate act, but also if he or she was a supervisor 
who directed others to violate a plaintiff’s rights or had knowledge of and 
acquiesced in his or her subordinates’ violations. The Drivers pled that McDonald 
developed the enforcement investigation that seized them. They pled that Riley 
supervised investigation units, including McDonald’s, and had to know of and 
acquiesce in the violation because he assigned subordinates to the team. And they 
pled that Chow was in charge of investigations where the investigation and 
seizures occurred, signed off on the plan, and was actually present at the site of the 
seizures.  These pleadings are more than sufficient to state a facially plausible 
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claim leading to the reasonable inference that the ICE Agents are liable for the 
alleged misconduct. 
Accordingly, because the Drivers have stated plausible Bivens claims and 
the ICE Agents are not entitled to qualified immunity, the district court erred when 
it granted the ICE Agents’ motion to dismiss.  Therefore, this Court should reverse 
the district court’s opinion.   
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ICE 
AGENTS HAD QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR INTERROGATING 
THE DRIVERS BASED ON THEIR WRONGFUL INCLUSION ON 
THE LIST.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review for a district 
court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds 
as it involves a pure question of law is de novo.   James v. City of 
Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012).  In reviewing a 
denial of qualified immunity at the  Rule 12(b)(6) stage of litigation, 
the Court accepts the plaintiffs’ allegations as true and draws all 
inferences in their favor. Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 442 (3d 
Cir. 2006). 
Since Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971), the Supreme Court has recognized an implied private action for damages 
against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s Fourth Amendment 
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rights.  Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012).  In confronting such 
claims, however, federal officers may assert the affirmative defense of qualified 
immunity.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672, 675 (2009).
Qualified immunity bars suit against a government official unless the official 
violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, (1982).
This inquiry must be conducted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking 
into account the specific context of the case. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 
(2001). Once a government official raises qualified immunity as a defense to suit, 
courts must engage in a two-pronged analysis: (1) whether the facts alleged by the 
plaintiff show violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was 
clearly established at the time of the violation.  Id. The constitutional right at issue 
here is the Fourth Amendment’s protection from “unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  To determine whether this right is clearly 
established, “a court must consider the state of the existing law at the time of the 
alleged violation and the circumstances confronting the officer to determine 
whether a reasonable state actor could have believed that his conduct was lawful.”
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010).   
The ICE Agents violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the Drivers to be 
free from unlawful seizures because the lack of indicia of their citizenship did not 
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create probable cause or reasonable suspicion so as to justify their inclusion on the 
list and subsequent arrest and interrogation—especially as this lack evidence was 
self-imposed because the Parking Authority was in possession of such 
documentation.  Further, the seizure was not sufficiently limited in scope because 
rather than routinely question the Drivers, they orchestrated a secret interrogation 
that involved subjective intrusion in the form of fear and emotional distress and 
which lasted for over an hour.
Moreover, reasonably competent ICE agents would know that the ICE 
Agents’ conduct was unlawful in arresting and interrogating the Drivers based on 
their wrongful inclusion on the list.  The well-developed caselaw on what 
constitutes a reasonable seizure and the contours of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence as they existed at time of the ICE Agents’ conduct demonstrate that 
the ICE Agents are not entitled to qualified immunity.   
A. The ICE Agents Violated The Drivers’ Fourth Amendment Right 
To Be Free From Unreasonable Seizures Where The Drivers’ 
Arrests And Interrogations Were Based On The ICE Agents’ 
Failure To Confirm Their Citizenship Despite Readily Available 
Evidence.
 Regarding the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the Drivers 
have alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that, in the light most favorable to 
them, the ICE Agents violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from an 
“unreasonable seizure” when the ICE Agents arrested and interrogated them based 
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on their inability to confirm the Drivers’ citizenship.  Under the Fourth 
Amendment, any seizure inquiry has two steps: determining whether there was in 
fact a seizure, and if so, whether that seizure was reasonable.  United States v. 
Smith, 575 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 It is undisputed that the ICE Agents seized the Drivers when the ICE Agents 
arrested, handcuffed, detained, and interrogated them for over an hour.  JA47, 48, 
52, 53, 56, 57.  The only questions, then, are whether the seizures were arrests or 
interrogations, and whether, in any case, the seizures were reasonable. See U.S. v. 
Laville, 480 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2007).
1. The initial seizures constituted arrests and were 
unreasonable because they were not based on probable 
cause.
 The ICE Agents’ initial seizures of the Drivers were arrests, requiring that 
they be based upon probable cause.  But no probable cause existed that justifies 
their inclusion on the interrogation list when the arrests were based on the ICE 
Agents’ unreasonable failure to discern the Drivers’ citizenship when such 
information was readily available and in the possession of the Parking Authority.
Accordingly, these arrests violated the Drivers’ Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from unreasonable seizures.   
 Immigration officials are statutorily permitted to, without a warrant, “arrest 
any alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe that the alien is . . . in 
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violation of any such law or regulation [regarding the admission, exclusion, 
expulsion, or removal of aliens] and is likely to escape before a warrant can be 
obtained . . . .”  8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).
 Whether an arrest has occurred is an objective inquiry based on “what a 
reasonable person would believe, based on the circumstances of the interrogation.”
U.S. v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing definition of “in 
custody” for purposes of Miranda rights).  Although the subjective intent of the 
officers or the suspect is irrelevant, see Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) 
(“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth 
Amendment analysis.”), whether an officer tells a person that he is arrested may be 
strong evidence that a suspect is under arrest.  This is because when an officer tells 
a person he is arrested, a reasonable person in the individual’s position would 
believe this to be so. See, e.g., Tebbens v. Mushol, 692 F.3d 807, 816 (7th Cir. 
2012) (finding that a reasonable person would believe they were under arrest when 
officer told person before placing his hands on him, that he was “going to make 
[the charges] stick”).  Other relevant factors indicating an arrest may include: 
blocking of suspect’s path or impeding his progress; retention of ticket or piece of 
identification; officer’s statement that suspect is subject of investigation; display of 
weapons; number of officers present and their demeanor; length of detention; and 
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extent to which officers physically restrained suspect.   U.S. v. Hammock, 860 F.2d 
390, 393 (11th Cir. 1988).
 Here, a reasonable person in the Drivers’ situation would believe they were 
under arrest.  Exemplifying all of the factors listed above, the ICE Agents and their 
subordinates told the Drivers they were under arrest for alleged immigration 
violations, JA47-48, 52, 56-57; they took their identification documents, JA47, 52, 
56; they displayed weapons and most were dressed in raid gear, JA49, 53, 59, 74-
75; they handcuffed the Drivers, JA47-48, 52, 56-57; there were twenty-two ICE 
agents present, JA74; and the interrogations lasted over an hour for each Driver, 
JA48, 52, 57.
 In any event, the initial seizure of the Drivers constitutes a de facto arrest, in 
that the interrogation was not “so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on 
reasonable suspicion,” and therefore ripened from an interrogation to an arrest, 
requiring probable cause. See, e.g., U.S. v. Leal, 235 F. App’x 937, 941 (3d Cir. 
2007) (quoting U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983)).
 As with all arrests, an arrest under § 1357(a)(2), whether de facto or 
otherwise, must be based upon probable cause. Olivia-Ramos v. Attorney Gen. of 
U.S., 694 F.3d 259, 285 (3d Cir. 2012) (“under section 1357(a)(2) . . . ‘arrest’ 
means an arrest upon probable cause”) (quoting  Babula v. I.N.S., 665 F.2d 293, 
298 (3d Cir. 1981)). “Probable cause exists whenever reasonably trustworthy 
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information or circumstances within an arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient 
to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been or is 
being committed by the person being arrested.”   Laville, 480 F.3d at 194. 
 Here, the ICE Agents did not have probable cause to arrest the Drivers.  The 
ICE Agents’ self-imposed failure to discern the Drivers’ citizenship when such 
information was readily available and in the possession of the Parking Authority 
does not permit a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the Drivers were 
illegal aliens.  Further, there is no evidence to suggest that the Drivers were, at any 
time, at risk of escaping.  See Mountain High Knitting, Inc. v. Reno, 51 F.3d 216, 
218 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that failure to carry alien registration documentation 
without more did not provide probable cause to arrest suspected undocumented 
employees for criminal violation of illegal reentry and that there was no evidence 
of escape risk).  Accordingly, because there is no probable cause, the arrests of the 
Drivers violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
seizures.
2. Even if the initial seizures of the Drivers were 
interrogations, they were unreasonable because they were 
not based on reasonable suspicion. 
 Even assuming the initial seizures of the Drivers were interrogations, the 
ICE Agents did not have reasonable suspicion justifying the Drivers’ inclusion on 
the list and their subsequent interrogation.  
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 Immigration officials are statutorily permitted to “interrogate any alien or 
person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or remain in the United States” 
without a warrant.  8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1).  But that authority is constrained by the 
Fourth Amendment, which “demands something more than the broad and 
unlimited discretion sought by the Government.” U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873, 882 (1975).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that for warrantless 
interrogations conducted under § 1357(a)(1) to be constitutional, they must be 
justified by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 884 (“For the same reasons that the Fourth 
Amendment forbids stopping vehicles at random to inquire if they are carrying 
aliens who are illegally in the country, it also forbids stopping or detaining persons 
for questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they 
may be aliens.”). 
 To determine whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, the Supreme 
Court has considered the “totality of the circumstances,” and “whether the 
detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal 
wrongdoing.” U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2001) (overturning the lower 
court’s formalistic methodology for determining reasonable suspicion); see also
U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (“Based upon that whole picture, the 
detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the 
particular person stopped of criminal activity.”).   
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 In Brignoni-Ponce, border patrol claimed that they had the authority to 
question occupants about their citizenship not only at fixed check points near the 
Mexican border, but also through random stops initiated by patrolling agents.  422 
U.S. at 877.  In executing these roving stops, border patrol’s only selection 
criterion was the occupants’ apparent Mexican ancestry. Id. at 875.  The Supreme 
Court, however, held that such interrogations, when based solely on the 
individual’s apparent ancestry, does not constitute reasonable suspicion and was 
proscribed by the Fourth Amendment. Id.; see also, Orhorhaghe v. I.N.S. 38 F.3d 
488, 497 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that plaintiff’s “Nigerian-sounding name” and the 
fact that the plaintiff’s name did not appear in I.N.S. records for lawful entries into 
the United states did not amount to reasonable suspicion that the alien was illegally 
in the country).  In Brignoni-Ponce, the Court also enumerated a non-exhaustive 
list of the possible factors that may give rise to reasonable suspicion, including 
reports of illegal aliens in the area, the specific behavior of the individuals, and 
other factors that may be in the expertise of the agent.  422 U.S. at 885.
 Thus, in finding reasonable suspicion, the courts have focused on the 
particularized factors observed by the officers.  For example, in  Lee v. I.N.S., 590 
F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1979), this Court found reasonable suspicion when an officer 
observed two individuals speaking in Chinese near a restaurant that was known to 
hire illegal immigrants, and one of the plaintiffs began acting suspiciously as the 
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officer approached.  590 F.2d at 499-500.  Similarly, in  Babula vs. I.N.S., 665 
F.2d. 293 (3d Cir. 1981), this Court found that immigration officials were within 
the scope of § 1357(a)(1) when they questioned factory workers after receiving an 
anonymous tip from a “reliable source” that illegal aliens were employed at the 
factory. Id. at 296. Within four months of receiving the tip, the I.N.S. agents in 
Babula had confirmed the identity of individuals who would not be questioned, so 
as to avoid interrogating American citizens and aliens legally present in the Unites 
States. Id. at 294.
 Here, the ICE Agents had no reasonable suspicion justifying the seizure of 
the Drivers because the mere absence of indicia of the Drivers’ citizenship cannot 
justify their interrogation—the absence of evidence is not evidence itself.  See, e.g.,
Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 497-98 (finding that the absence of the plaintiff’s name in 
I.N.S. records for lawful entries into the United states did not amount to reasonable 
suspicion that the alien was illegally in the country); Mountain High, 51 F.3d at 
218 (finding lack of alien registration documentation, without more, does not 
provide probable cause of the criminal violation of illegal entry).  This adage is 
especially true in this case considering the totality of the circumstances.  
McDonald had over a year to acquire the readily available citizenship 
documentation of the Drivers before placing them on the list for interrogation—
that the ICE Agents were purportedly unable to confirm their citizenship results 
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from their own unreasonable failing.  See JA46, 73-74.  Without any explanation 
as to why the ICE Agents and their subordinates did not or could not obtain the 
readily available citizenship documentation from the Parking Authority or 
elsewhere, the ICE Agents have pointed to no particularized factor that might 
indicate alienage, much less illegal status.  Rather, such failing absent any 
allegations otherwise, indicates that the ICE Agents simply relied on the Drivers’ 
biographical information to assume alienage.  Cf. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 875 
(finding that relying solely on apparent descent does not constitute reasonable 
suspicion for purposes of determining whether a seizure was reasonable);
Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 497-98 (finding that a foreign sounding name alone does 
not constitute reasonable suspicion).    
 Here, however, it took the ICE Agents and their subordinates over a year to 
implement the operation.  JA46, 73-74.  Yet despite varied and numerous 
resources, including the Parking Authority’s records of the Drivers’ U.S. 
citizenship, and their unconstrained timeframe, the ICE Agents and their 
subordinates purportedly still could not confirm the Drivers’ citizenship.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court recently described the breadth of ICE’s capabilities: “ICE’s 
Law Enforcement Support Center operates ‘24 hours a day, seven days a week, 
365 days a year’ and provides, among other things, ‘immigration status, identity 
information and real-time assistance to local, state and federal law enforcement 
Case: 13-1881     Document: 003111295601     Page: 34      Date Filed: 06/17/2013
- 27 - 
agencies.’”  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (citing ICE, 
Fact Sheet: Law Enforcement Support Center (May 29, 2012), online at 
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/lesc.htm) (reviewing the reach of 
federal regulation on immigration in relation to states’ interest in setting 
immigration policy).  
 Moreover, even if reasonable suspicion exists, the inquiry would not end 
there—the seizure must also be reasonably related to the circumstances that 
justified the intrusion initially. Lee, 590 F.2d at 499-500; see also, Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)).  This 
inquiry requires a balancing of governmental interests and the individual freedoms 
at stake. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882-84 (balancing the interests of Border 
Patrol agents in randomly stopping vehicles for questioning against Fourth 
Amendment rights of citizen).
 In  Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court thought it reasonably justified, given 
the interests of border patrol agents in securing the borders, to allow agents to 
conduct an inquiry described as “a response to a brief question or two and possibly 
the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United States.” Id. at 
880; see also U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (finding that 
“routine” vehicle stops do not give rise to an objectionable intrusion on personal 
freedoms). Likewise, in  Lee, this Court found an officer’s questioning of 
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individuals to be justified in scope, given that the officer merely approached 
individuals speaking in Chinese near a restaurant known to hire illegal immigrants, 
identified himself as an agent, and inquired about their identity.  590 F.2d at 502.
In Delgado, the Supreme Court similarly held that an I.N.S. agent’s questioning of 
individuals in a factory was justified in scope since the factory workers were 
allowed to continue with their routine despite the presence of I.N.S. agents.  466 
U.S. at 218.
 Here, the interrogation imposed a far more significant burden.  The 
interrogation in this case is far from routine questioning.  Cf. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 
218 (finding that an INS agent’s questioning of individuals in a factory was 
justified in scope since the factory workers were allowed to continue with their 
routine despite the presence of INS agents). The ICE Agents created a decoy 
refund scheme to lure the Drivers in for a secret interrogation that involved 
violence and intimidation.  See JA47, 48, 52, 56-57, 74.  In addition to the 
objective intrusion found here (i.e., the actual interrogation), there was also 
substantial subjective intrusion in the form of fear and emotional distress.  See
U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (drawing a distinction between 
roving patrols and fixed checkpoints based on the existence of both an objective 
and subjective intrusion in roving patrol).  Most importantly, though, the 
interrogations lasted for more than hour, JA48, 52, 57, which is far longer than the 
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momentary ones discussed in cases such as  Brignoni-Ponce. See also U.S. v 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-710 (1983) (“[T]he brevity of the invasion of the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining 
whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable 
suspicion.”).
B. Reasonably Competent ICE Agents Would Know That The 
Failure To Confirm The Drivers’ Citizenship Despite Readily 
Available Documentation Does Not Constitute Probable Cause Or 
Reasonable Suspicion.
Under the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the Drivers’ 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures must be “clearly 
established,” such that if at the time the interrogation occurred, it would be clear to 
reasonably competent ICE agents that the ICE Agents’ conduct was unlawful in 
the situation they confronted.” See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.  Furthermore, 
although the abstract right to be free from unreasonable seizure clearly is 
established, for qualified immunity purposes, the right must be considered on a 
more specific level: “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”   In
re City of Philadelphia Litig., 49 F.3d 945, 961 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting  Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).  In making such a determination, “a court 
must consider the state of the existing law at the time of the alleged violation and 
the circumstances confronting the officer to determine whether a reasonable state 
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actor could have believed that his conduct was lawful.”   Kelly, 622 F.3d at 253.
“[I]f the law was clearly established [at the time of the conduct], the immunity 
defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should 
know the law governing his conduct.” Id. (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19).
This Court has also recognized, in the context of determining the 
applicability of qualified immunity, that “[p]olice officers generally have a duty to 
know the basic elements of the laws they enforce. Id. at 258; see also Orsatti v. 
New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The obligation of local 
law enforcement officers is to conduct criminal investigations in a manner that 
does not violate the constitutionally protected rights of the person under 
investigation.”).   
1. Reasonably competent ICE agents would not believe they 
had probable cause to arrest the Drivers. 
At the time of the ICE Agents’ conduct, the Third Circuit held that 
immigration officials’ arrest powers under  § 1357(a)(2) require officials to have 
probable cause justifying such an arrest.  See Babula, 665 F.2d at 298 (‘arrest’ 
under section 1357(a)(2) means an arrest upon probable cause, and not simply a 
detention for purposes of interrogation).  Here, no reasonably competent ICE 
agents would believe that they had probable cause to arrest the Drivers.  Probable 
cause requires that a reasonable person to conclude that an offense is being 
committed.  The absence of documentation confirming the Drivers’ status, 
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however, cannot rise to the level of indicating that they are, in fact, likely to be 
illegal aliens.  As the Ninth Circuit found in Mountain High, recognized, 
“although the lack of documentation or other admission of illegal presence may be 
some indication of illegal entry, it does not, without more, provide probable cause 
of the criminal violation of illegal entry.”  51 F.3d at 218 (quotation and marks 
omitted).  Moreover, the plain language of  § 1357(a)(2) requires the arresting 
officer reasonably believe that the alien is in the country illegal and that he is 
“likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” Id. Here, as in 
Mountain High, no additional particularized evidence exists as is required for 
probable cause, and the ICE Agents have not alleged grounds for a reasonable 
belief that the Drivers were particularly likely to escape.  Accordingly, because no 
reasonable ICE agents could believe that their conduct was lawful, the ICE Agents 
are not entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court erred in holding 
otherwise.
2. Reasonably competent ICE agents would not believe they 
had reasonable suspicion.
Similarly, the Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of warrantless 
interrogations under  § 1357(a)(1) must be based on reasonable suspicion.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.  Because analyzing the reasonableness of 
seizures in this context turns on whether reasonable suspicion existed, to determine 
the boundaries of the law as it existed, the appropriate inquiry here is whether 
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reasonably competent ICE Agents would know that they did not have reasonable 
suspicion in interrogating the Drivers.   
Cases since  Brignoni-Ponce have further defined and narrowed the contours 
by enumerating and evaluating specific factors and circumstances that satisfy 
reasonable suspicion.  For example, relying on Brignoni-Ponce, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected the I.N.S.’s contention that the plaintiff’s foreign sounding name, without 
more, provided reasonable suspicion to seize and interrogate him.   Orhorhaghe,
38 F.3d at 497-98.  Importantly, the court also rejected that the absence of any 
record of the plaintiff’s entry into the U.S. did not provide any additional basis for 
suspecting he was an illegal alien. Id. at 498.  See also,  Lee v. I.N.S., 590 F.2d 497 
(3d Cir. 1979) (finding reasonable suspicion when an officer observed two 
individuals speaking in Chinese near a restaurant that was known to hire illegal 
immigrants, and one of the plaintiffs began acting suspiciously as the officer 
approached).
The foregoing analysis, however, is noticeably absent from the district 
court’s finding that the ICE Agents’ interrogation did not violate a clearly 
established right.  Rather, the district court cursorily found that reasonable ICE 
agents would not know that their conduct was unlawful in light of immigration 
agents’ interrogation authority under  § 1357(a)(1), and based upon the fact that the 
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ICE Agents created the list over the course of a year and exchanged various 
versions.  JA12-13.
The district court’s reliance on that fact that there was more than a year 
between initiation of the investigation and its operational execution, however, is 
based on the faulty premise that the lengthy interim period and the fact that various 
versions were exchanged therein reflects a thorough investigation.  But this 
reasoning ignores that taken in the light most favorable to the Drivers, rather than 
reflect diligence, it can indicate neglect, inefficiency, and non-urgency, as 
evidenced by the ICE Agents’ failure to determine the Drivers’ citizenship despite 
readily available evidence and ICE’s tremendous resources.  Indeed, this 
suppositional conflict illustrates the need for discovery here. 
Further, rather than support the district court’s finding that reasonable ICE 
agents would not know that the interrogation of the Drivers was unlawful,  
§ 1357(a)(1) actually supports the opposite conclusion.  As discussed above, the 
Supreme Court has expressly held that the authority and discretion granted to 
immigration officials under § 1357(a)(1) is not limitless—it is constrained by the 
Fourth Amendment’s requirement of having reasonable suspicion in executing 
such seizures. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
Accordingly, because the Supreme Court has directly addressed the 
boundaries of the specific constitutional right and statute at issue here, no 
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reasonably competent ICE agent can be excused from knowing that seizures 
grounded in anything less than reasonable suspicion are unlawful. And as 
illustrated by the existing law as applied to the circumstances here, a reasonable 
ICE agent should have known that reasonable suspicion cannot be justified by 
reference only to the absence of indicia of citizenship.  Moreover, a reasonable ICE 
agent should be aware that the aggressive manner in which the initial interrogation 
was conducted, coupled with its extended duration, far exceeded the justification 
that the Drivers might be illegal aliens.  Accordingly, the district court’s holding 
that the ICE Agents were entitled to qualified immunity for the initial interrogation 
and seizure of the Drivers should be reversed.   
II. THE DISTRICT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ICE AGENTS 
WERE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR 
CONTINUING TO DETAIN THE DRIVERS FOR SEVERAL HOURS 
AFTER CONFIRMING THEIR CITIZENSHIP.    
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review for a 
district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity 
grounds as it involves a pure question of law is de novo.   James v. 
City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012).  In reviewing 
a denial of qualified immunity at the  Rule 12(b)(6) stage of litigation, 
the Court accepts the plaintiffs’ allegations as true and draws all 
inferences in their favor. Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 442 (3d 
Cir. 2006). 
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 The ICE Agents and their subordinates again violated the Drivers’ Fourth 
Amendment Rights to be free from unreasonable seizure after they continued to 
detain the Drivers for several hours after confirming their citizenship.  Such 
detention could not be based in reasonable suspicion once the ICE Agents 
confirmed the Drivers’ citizenship even to their own satisfaction.  Further, 
reasonable ICE agents would have known that the continued detention of the 
Drivers for several hours after confirming their citizenship was an unconstitutional 
seizure.  As discussed above, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence makes clear that 
these circumstances squarely fall within the definition of a seizure, and the several 
additional hours for which the Drivers were detained are not de minimis.  
Accordingly, the ICE Agents were not entitled to qualified immunity, and the 
district court erred in so holding.   
A. The ICE Agents Violated The Drivers’ Fourth Amendment Right 
To Be Free From Unreasonable Seizure When They Detained The 
Drivers For Several Hours After Confirming Their Citizenship.  
 The Drivers have alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that, separate and 
apart from their initial unreasonable arrest and interrogation, the ICE Agents 
violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure a 
second time when the ICE Agents continued to detain the Drivers for several hours 
after confirming their U.S. citizenship.  The central dispute here is whether the 
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Drivers’ continued detention for several additional hours constituted a seizure or a 
de minimis detention.   
 A seizure occurs when an officer, by show of authority, restrains the liberty 
of a citizen in some way.  U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980).  To 
delineate between mere questioning and actual seizure of an individual not under 
arrest, the Supreme Court has considered whether under the circumstances, a 
reasonable individual would believe he was free to leave or free to refuse to answer 
an officer’s questions. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984); Oliva-Ramos, 694 
F.3d at 283-84 (“[A] person has been ‘seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment only, if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”) (quotation 
omitted).  Such relevant circumstances include a show of force or intimidating 
tactics by the acting officers. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215.  Questioning may amount 
to a seizure even if the questioned individual does not attempt to leave.  Factors 
that may indicate a seizure when an individual did not attempt to leave include the 
intimidating presence of several officers, exposed weapons, physical touching, or 
“the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s 
request might be compelled.”   Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
 Although the Supreme Court in Delgado found no seizure “in a factory 
survey” operation where I.N.S. agents questioned individuals in a factory 
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suspected of hiring illegal immigrants, the Court highlighted that under the 
particular circumstances of that case, the individuals were allowed to proceed with 
their normal workday procedures despite the ongoing questioning: “the employees 
were about their ordinary business, operating machinery and performing other job 
assignments.  Even though the surveys did cause some disruption, including the 
efforts of some workers to hide, the record also indicates that workers were not 
prevented by the agents from moving about the factories.”  Delgado, 466 U.S. at 
218. 
 The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable seizures extends “to all seizures of the person, 
including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.”
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878.  Indeed, in determining the constitutional 
boundaries of warrantless interrogations by immigration agents under   
§ 1357(a)(1), the Court found that the “modest intrusion” resulting from random 
stops by border patrol—stops that were limited to visual inspections and usually 
consumed no more than one minute—were nonetheless unreasonable seizures 
under the  Fourth Amendment.   Id. at 880, 883.  Both the Supreme Court and this 
Court have previously found that detaining U.S. citizens is only proper for very 
brief periods of time when there is a legitimate public concern at stake, including 
for example, allowing officials to conduct a search of an individual’s residence 
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suspected of serious criminal charges, or while officers attempt to verify or dispel 
their suspicions in felony drug courier cases.  See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 
U.S. 692 (1981) (residence); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (drug courier); 
accord U.S. v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1993) (drug courier).  Other circuit 
courts that have considered the issue of de minimis detention pertaining to the 
Fourth Amendment generally characterize de minimis detention in very brief 
periods of time such as minutes, rather than hours.1
 Here, the jurisprudence supports that the circumstances in the continuing to 
detain Drivers all fall within the factors demonstrating a seizure and not a de 
minimis violation.  Specifically, the ICE Agents and their subordinates detained 
and repeatedly told the Drivers that they were not permitted to leave despite being 
wrongfully seized.  JA48, 53, 58.  ICE Agents and their subordinates held the 
Drivers in custody against their will for several additional hours.  JA49, 53, 58.
1 See, e.g., U.S. v. Norwood, 377 Fed. Appx. 580, 581 (8th Cir. 2010) (minute and 
a half seizure while officer searched the plaintiff’s vehicle was de minimis and not 
a violation of his Fourth Amendment right);  U.S. v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 
505, 511 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e do not think [the officer] effected an unreasonable 
seizure simply by asking three brief questions related to possible drug trafficking 
amidst his other traffic-related inquiries and tasks”);   Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 245, 
247 (7th Cir. 1997) (a routine traffic stop was de minimis under Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny).  Most notably, however, “the weight of Third Circuit 
authority indicates that investigatory stops lasting less than one hour are within the 
purview of Terry and do not constitute arrests requiring probable cause.” Apata v. 
Howard, No. 05-3204, 2008 WL 4372917, at *25 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2008) (citing
Brown v. City of Phila., No. 07-0192, 2008 WL 269495, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 
2008) (collecting cases) (alteration in original)). 
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During the detention, ICE Agents and their subordinates refused to allow the 
Drivers to speak or stand.  JA48, 53, 58.  ICE agents wearing raid gear and 
displaying guns strapped to their waists also stood by the holding room exit.  JA48, 
49, 53, 58; see JA74-75.  And unlike Delgado, the continued detention not only 
disrupted the daily lives of the Drivers, but also limited their physical movement.   
 Additionally, although the ICE Agents do not appear to assert that they had 
reasonable suspicion to detain the Drivers because of their desire to prevent the 
Drivers from “tipping-off” the other taxi drivers who had not yet arrived, the ICE 
Agents’ mere “hunch” is insufficient to justify such prolonged and continued 
detention. See, e.g., Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1144 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting officer’s belief that a suspect’s co-worker and friend “knew more than he 
was willing to say” about the suspect as sufficient to justify his continued detention 
because such conjecture was not anchored in any factual observation). 
 Given these circumstances, any reasonable person would have understood 
that he was not permitted to leave the room where the Drivers were being held.  
See Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 283-84 (using an objective standard to determine 
whether there was a show of authority).  The district court erred in comparing the 
Drivers’ prolonged and restrictive detention to the manner in which the ICE 
Agents treated the taxi drivers whom they correctly determined to be illegal aliens.
JA14 (“[The Drivers] do not allege that once their citizenship status was confirmed 
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that they were thereafter handcuffed or treated in the same manner as those 
determined to be illegal aliens.”).  Moreover, the failure to use handcuffs after 
determining their citizenship is not the dispositive issue in this case.  Detaining 
U.S. citizens for several hours, forbidding them to leave, stand, or speak, while 
standing by the exits armed and in raid gear, is substantial evidence to indicate a 
show of authority. Cf. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.  The district court applied a 
misguided principle by discounting the fact that the Drivers were held in custody 
against their will merely for lack of physical restraint of handcuffs.  Indeed, Lawal 
and Shittu even expressly asked to leave but were denied.  JA49, 58.     
B. A Reasonably Competent ICE Agent Would Have Known That 
Continuing to Detain The Drivers After Confirming Their 
Citizenship Violated The Fourth Amendment. 
In light of the well-established rule requirement announced in  Brignoni-
Ponce that immigration officials may only exercise their authority to conduct 
warrantless seizures where reasonable suspicion exists, a reasonably competent 
ICE agent could not believe that an unreasonable detention for several hours is a de 
minimis violation, rather than an unlawful seizure.  Indeed, in the specific context 
of  § 1357(a)(1), the Supreme Court in Brignoni-Ponce  found that even a one 
minute detention absent reasonable suspicion constitutes an unreasonable seizure 
under the  Fourth Amendment.  422 U.S. at 880, 883.  Considering the totality of 
the circumstances and the sheer lack of any reasonable suspicion for detaining the 
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Drivers once their citizenship status was confirmed, the continued detention was an 
unreasonable seizure.  And the district court’s reasoning that the absence of 
handcuffs or the provision of food should counsel otherwise, JA14, is without any 
legal support. Cf. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 55 (listing factors that could 
demonstrate a seizure).     
Continued detention of a U.S. citizen without a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity violates a clearly established constitutional right.  In light of the 
draconian detention methods employed by the ICE Agents—holding the Drivers 
against their will for several hours, and prohibiting them to stand, speak or leave 
the room, JA48-49, 53, 57-59—no reasonable ICE agent would believe his conduct 
was a reasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, justified by reasonable 
suspicion.  And any ICE agent reasonably aware of the law would understand that 
continuing to confine the Drivers for several hours after confirming their 
citizenship would rise to a level far greater than a de minimis level of detention; 
rather, such confinement constitutes an unreasonable seizure in light of the clear 
contours of this jurisprudence.
Moreover, the district court’s finding that that the Drivers have “not 
allege[d] or argue[d] that the [ICE Agents’] stated purpose for keeping them at 
Parking Authority headquarters until the operation was concluded was not 
legitimate,” JA14, fails to recognize that the Drivers need not make such 
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“allegations or arguments” in order to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that no 
reasonably competent ICE agent would believe that the continued detention of the 
Drivers was reasonable. See also Manzanares, 575 F.3d at 1144 (finding that an 
officer could not reasonably believe he could detain a suspect’s co-worker and 
friend based on his hunch that individual “knew more than he was willing to say”).
More brazenly, this reasoning introduces some new, lesser justification for 
abridging a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights even after the Supreme Court 
already rejected such attempts in  Brignoni-Ponce. See 422 U.S. at 884 (rejecting 
the government’s assertion that warrantless seizures under § 1357(a)(1) may be 
justified solely on the immigration official’s sole discretion).
Similarly, for reasonable ICE agents to believe that the the reason for 
continuing to detain the Drivers—namely, to maintain the element of surprise, see
JA49, 53, 58—could create a reasonable belief in the lawfulness of the ICE 
Agents’ conduct would require them to believe that the Drivers’ constitutional 
rights can give way to mere hunches absent any supporting evidence.  This is 
especially true where the ICE Agents already implemented other methods to 
address such concerns when they scheduled the Drivers’ interviews towards the 
latter half of the schedule.  JA75.  Weighing the balance in favor of the Drivers’ 
constitutional freedom from unlawful seizure and, most importantly, in the absence 
of any reasonable basis of suspecting that the Drivers were illegal demonstrates 
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that no legal foothold exists that would allow reasonable ICE agents to find that the 
ICE Agents and their subordinates believed their conduct was lawful.
Accordingly, the district court’s finding that the ICE Agents were not aware 
that the Drivers had a clearly established constitutional right not to be detained 
once their citizenship was confirmed is unfounded, and this Court should reverse 
the decision.
III. THE DRIVERS STATED A CLAIM FOR VIOLATIONS OF THEIR 
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review over a district 
court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is de novo.  The Court must accept as true all 
of the factual allegations in the complaint as well as the reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from them.   Brown v. Philip Morris Inc.,
250 F.3d 789, 796 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the Agent fair notice of what 
the . . . claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain detailed factual 
allegations. Id.  Rather, a complaint need only contain sufficient factual matter 
that, accepted as true, “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”   
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).  A claim is facially 
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plausible when a plaintiff pleads factual content that enables the court to draw a 
reasonable inference that the Agent is liable for any of the alleged misconduct.  Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 
 The Drivers stated a Bivens claim by alleging facts that allow the reasonable 
inference that the ICE Agents’ gross negligence and deliberate indifference 
violated the Drivers’ rights to be free from unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment. See JA49, 54, 59; see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390.  To be personally 
liable for a Bivens claim, a Agent must have been involved in the violation in some 
way. See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 129 (3d Cir. 2010).  
But to plead personal involvement, a plaintiff need only allege an individual 
directed or knew of and acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct.  See Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Santiago, 629 F.3d at 
129 (“supervisor may be personally liable . . . if he or she participated in violating 
the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, 
had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.”).  Personal 
involvement can also be demonstrated where a supervisor has established or 
maintained a policy, practice, or custom that directly caused the constitutional 
harm. Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129.  The Drivers sufficiently alleged involvement. 
 The Drivers alleged the subordinates who took the ultimate actions were 
operating under the ICE Agents’ direction when they arrested, seized, interrogated, 
Case: 13-1881     Document: 003111295601     Page: 52      Date Filed: 06/17/2013
- 45 - 
and detained each of the Drivers.  Specifically, McDonald developed the 
enforcement investigation that seized the Drivers, JA73-74; Riley supervised 
investigation units, including McDonald’s, JA78; and Chow was in charge of 
investigations where the violation occurred, Philadelphia, JA80-81.  Indeed, the 
ICE Agents had to know of the unconstitutional conduct because they directly 
developed and approved the plan.  JA73-74, 78, 80-81.  Moreover, McDonald and 
Chow personally and directly supervised the plan’s execution.  JA73-75, 80-81. 
 The facts alleged demonstrate the ICE Agents are not high-ranking officials, 
thus it is facially plausible that they possessed actual knowledge of and acquiesced 
in the offending conduct. See Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 271 (3d Cir. 
2003) (distinguishing Agent correctional commissioner from Governor and 
Attorney General based on scope of responsibilities and finding court could not 
conclude the Drivers did not have actual knowledge of alleged misconduct).  This 
case is not like Argueta v. ICE, where plaintiffs brought an action against “four 
high-ranking federal officials,” alleging ICE conducted unlawful and abusive raids 
on immigrant homes.  643 F.3d 60, 62 (3d Cir. 2011).  There, the Court held 
plaintiffs failed to allege a plausible claim because the high-ranking officials were 
charged with enforcing immigration law throughout the entire country, had 
national supervisory responsibilities, and did not have notice of the underlying 
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unconstitutional conduct.  Id. at 76-77.  Here, the named ICE Agents are lower-
ranking officials with much narrower supervisory responsibilities. 
 The Drivers therefore alleged facts sufficient to state a claim, and this Court 
should reverse the District Court’s holding to the contrary.  Even if they had not, 
though, the Court should remand the case to the district court for more specific 
allegations to be pled and so that a second amended complaint can name unknown 
ICE officers as defendants until they are identified through discovery. 
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants Oliver Lawal, Daosamid Bounthisane, 
and Gazali Shittun respectfully request that this Court reverse the judgment below. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    
OLIVER LAWAL, DAOSAMID : CIVIL ACTION
BOUNTHISANE, and GAZALI SHITTU, :     
: 




MARK MCDONALD, WILLIAM RILEY, :  




AND NOW, this 26th day of February, 2013, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 8)
is GRANTED.
2. The Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs Oliver Lawal, Daosamid Bounthisane and 
Gazali Shittu (Dkt. No. 6) is DISMISSED with prejudice. 
BY THE COURT:
      /s/ C. Darnell Jones, II 
      _________________________  
      C. DARNELL JONES, II J.
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: 




MARK MCDONALD, WILLIAM RILEY, :  




Jones, II, J.         February 26, 2013
Plaintiffs Oliver Lawal, Daosamid Bounthisane and Gazali Shittu brought this action 
claiming violations of their rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution.  Defendants Mark McDonald, William Riley and Frederick R. Chow are employed 
as Special Agents by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement bureau (“ICE”) of the United 
States Department of Homeland Security.  Plaintiffs, who are each United States citizens and 
hold licenses to operate taxicabs in the City of Philadelphia, allege that the Defendants 
wrongfully arrested and detained them during a sweep coordinated by ICE and the Philadelphia 
Parking Authority (“PPA”) designed to detect illegal aliens who were driving taxis in 
Philadelphia.  Presently before this Court is a Motion by the Defendants to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.  (Dkt. No. 8.)  For the reasons 
that follow, the Motion is granted.1
                                               
1All parties have appended matters outside of the pleadings to their moving papers.
Because this Court determines the Motion without reference to the outside matter, the Motion is 
construed solely as one filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
 In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), courts must “accept all factual 
allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled 
to relief.”  Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).  After the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), “threadbare
recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements” do not 
suffice.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable of the alleged misconduct.”  Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).  This 
standard, which applies to all civil cases, “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 
has acted unlawfully.”  Id. at 678; accord Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (“All civil complaints must contain more than an unadorned the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”).  Moreover, “the factual detail in a complaint [must not be] 
so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant [with] the type of notice of claim which is 
contemplated by Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].”  Villegas v. Weinstein & 
Riley, P.S., 723 F. Supp. 2d 755, 756 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232). 
II. FACTS
 In their Amended Complaint,2 Plaintiffs allege that in or about June 2009, Defendant 
McDonald contacted William P. Schmid, the Enforcement Manager of PPA’s Taxicab and 
Limousine Division, to request a list of all taxicab drivers certified by PPA to operate a taxicab 
in Philadelphia (“the PPA List”).  (Am. Compl. ¶ 12.)  Over the next year, PPA and ICE then 
                                               
2Plaintiffs’ original Complaint was filed on June 26, 2012.  Defendants filed a Motion to 
Dismiss the Complaint on October 2, 2012.  Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint. 
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exchanged various versions of the operator list in an effort to create a final working list (“the 
working list”) identifying suspected illegal alien taxicab drivers.  (Id. at ¶ 14.)  On June 15, 2010, 
PPA, “at the request and direction of Defendants, sent a letter to Plaintiffs advising each Plaintiff 
that he was entitled to a refund from PPA and instructed each Plaintiff to arrive at PPA 
headquarters on June 23, 2010.”  (Id. at ¶ 16.)  Each Plaintiff appeared at PPA headquarters on 
June 23, 2010, but was told to return on June 30, 2010 to receive their refunds.  (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 18.)  
When they arrived on June 30, 2010, each Plaintiff provided his driver’s license, taxicab ID, and 
name, date of birth, address, and social security number to an unidentified female ICE agent, and 
was instructed to enter another room to receive their refunds.  (Id. at ¶¶ 22, 54, 86.)  Upon 
entering the other room, each Plaintiff alleges that he was suddenly and violently attacked, 
thrown against a wall and handcuffed by Defendants and other ICE agents under Defendants’ 
direction and control, and were told they were under arrest for alleged immigration violations.  
(Id. at ¶¶ 23, 55, 87.)  Each informed the ICE agents that they were United States citizens.  (Id. at 
¶¶ 24, 56, 88.)  Each Plaintiff alleges that he was interrogated for more than one hour by 
Defendants and other ICE agents under Defendants’ direction and control.  (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 58, 90.)  
Thereafter, each Plaintiff was told he had been mistakenly detained, but all three were 
nonetheless held for several additional hours with other persons arrested in the operation, and 
were forbidden to stand or speak. 3  (Id. at ¶¶ 27-30, 60-63, 96-99.)  Defendants advised the 
Plaintiffs that they had to remain because Defendants did not want them to have an opportunity 
                                               
3Plaintiff Lawal makes additional allegations that he told “Defendants and other ICE 
agents who were under Defendants’ direction and control” that his United States passport and 
certificate of citizenship were located in his taxicab, which had already been towed to an 
unknown location by the PPA.  An unnamed PPA representative traveled to this unknown 
location and returned with Lawal’s documents.  Thereafter, like the other Plaintiffs, he was told 
that he was mistakenly detained, but held for an additional time.  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 92-99.)  Lawal 
also alleges that Defendants offered him coffee and donuts while he waited.  (Id. ¶ 101.)  
Case 2:12-cv-03599-CDJ   Document 13   Filed 02/26/13   Page 3 of 11
???
Case: 13-188      Document: 003111295601   Page: 68      Date Filed: 06/ 7/2013
4 
to advise other taxicab drivers of the ICE operation occurring at PPA headquarters that day.  (Id.
at ¶¶ 33,65, 104.)  
Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert Bivens4 claims that Defendants’ gross 
negligence and deliberate indifference violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from 
unreasonable seizure of their persons by arresting them without probable cause, by refusing to 
release them once they learned they were United States citizens, and by failing to release them 
once their citizenship was determined.  (Id. at ¶¶ 39, 71, 110.)  Plaintiffs also assert that 
Defendants’ failure to ensure that no United States citizens’ name was on the working list, and 
their mistakenly including the Plaintiffs on the working list, constituted outrageous and 
conscience shocking governmental conduct violative of their liberty and due process rights under 
the Fifth Amendment.  (Id. at ¶¶ 46-50, 78-82, 117-121.)  In their Motion, Defendants argue that 
the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint fail to state viable Bivens claims, and that 
each Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.  They also argue that Plaintiffs’ Fifth 
Amendment claims should be dismissed because they are properly analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
III. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
 This Court finds that the claims Plaintiffs present as substantive due process claims under 
the Fifth Amendment — that Defendants’ failure to ensure that no United States citizens’ name 
was on the PPA list, and by including their names on the working list, was egregious, outrageous 
and conscience shocking — are properly addressed as Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure 
claims.  In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that 
“where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection 
                                               
4A cause of action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) is 
the “federal analog to suits brought against state officials under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”  Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 676 (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 (2006)). 
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against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized 
notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Id. at 395 
(holding that, in a case asserting both a Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim and a 
Fourth Amendment excessive force claim arising in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop, 
that the cause of action should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its reasonableness 
standard, rather than under a substantive due process approach).  However, the Supreme Court 
has made clear that Graham is limited to situations where there is a specific constitutional 
provision that applies to the alleged conduct.  United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272, n.7 
(1997) (stating that “Graham requires that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific 
constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed 
under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due 
process.”); see also, Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-844 (1998) (stating that 
substantive due process analysis is “inappropriate . . . if respondents’ claim is ‘covered by’ the 
Fourth Amendment,” but holding that Graham did not apply because there was no search or 
seizure under the Court’s precedents); Chester Upland Sch. Dist. v. Pennsylvania, Civ. A. No. 
12-132, 2012 WL 1344368, at *6 (E.D. Pa. April 17, 2012) (stating that Supreme Court 
precedents have shown distinct disfavor of allowing substantive claims of due process to proceed 
when alternative constitutional grounds can achieve the same results).  Although the holding in 
Graham arose in the Fourth Amendment context of excessive force, it has been applied to other 
allegations of unreasonable searches and seizures.  See, e.g., Garcia-Torres v. Holder, 660 F.3d 
333, 337 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that “[a]ll claims of an unconstitutional search or seizure must 
be addressed solely in terms of the Fourth Amendment, not the “fundamental fairness” 
requirement “under a ‘substantive due process’ approach”); Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 
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F.3d 196, 205 (2nd Cir. 2007) (applying Graham to the Fourth Amendment context of a claim of 
unreasonably prolonged detention); Bryant v. Vernoski, Civ. A. No. 11-263, 2011 WL 4400820, 
at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2011) (holding that plaintiffs could not state a substantive due process 
claim based on governmental behavior of shooting plaintiff’s dog because claim was covered by 
the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures of “effects”); Schor v. North 
Braddock Borough, 801 F. Supp. 2d 369, 379 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (same).  
Here, Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims are unquestionably covered by the Fourth 
Amendment since they are based on allegations of an unlawful seizure.  While Plaintiffs argue 
that their Fifth Amendment claims are based on the creation of the working list and the inclusion 
of their names on it arise out of different conduct than their claims brought under the Fourth 
Amendment, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs it is clear that the activity of 
identifying them as possible illegal aliens, and actually detaining them, was part of a single,
continuous process that led to the asserted constitutional violations.  Since the propriety of arrest 
and detention by governmental officials go to the heart of the Fourth Amendment protection 
against unreasonable seizures, this Court concludes that the substantive due process claims fail to 
state plausible claims for relief. 5
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
 This Court also finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their pleading burden on their 
Fourth Amendment claims.  First, the Amended Complaint is entirely bereft of factual 
allegations identifying each Defendant’s specific actions in the incident leading to the Plaintiffs’ 
                                               
5Plaintiffs ask that, in the event this Court finds that their substantive due process claims 
are subject to dismissal, that they be permitted to file a further amendment in order to incorporate 
all relevant allegations contained in Counts II, IV and VI into the claims brought under the 
Fourth Amendment.  In discussing the viability of the remaining claims and Defendants’ 
entitlement to qualified immunity, this Court will assume that the entire factual basis for the Fifth 
Amendment claims already appear in Counts I, III and V. 
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appearances at the PPA headquarters, their treatment once they arrived, and the decision-making 
process leading to their eventual release, so as to plausibly draw a reasonable inference that any 
of the named Defendants is liable for any of the alleged misconduct.  For example, the allegation 
that each Plaintiff was “suddenly and violently attacked, thrown against a wall and handcuffed” 
fails to name which specific Defendant engaged in this conduct.  Likewise, Plaintiffs do not 
identify which Defendant held them in custody for several hours after their citizenship statuses
were affirmatively established.  Other than its introductory paragraphs, the Amended Complaint 
does not even mention Defendants Riley and Chow by name, and the sole mention of Defendant 
McDonald alleges only that he contacted the PPA to request the initial PPA list of all taxicab 
drivers certified by PPA to operate a taxicab in Philadelphia, an allegation that does not directly 
implicate the Plaintiffs’ inclusion on the final working list of those taxicab drivers for whom 
citizenship status could not be confirmed, or their arrests and detention.  (Am. Compl. ¶ 12.)  
While Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged that all Defendants “were present for and 
participated directly in the unlawful arrest, seizure and detention of each Plaintiff,” (Pl. Br. at 13 
(citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38, 70, 109)), this allegation is insufficient to plausibly permit this Court 
to draw a reasonable inference as to which Defendants are liable for the alleged misconduct.
 Second, the Iqbal Court reiterated that a federal official sued in his or her individual 
capacity for alleged constitutionally tortious behavior cannot be held liable on the basis of some 
general link to allegedly responsible individuals or actions.  Id., 556 U.S. at 676-77 (“[A] 
plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own actions, 
has violated the Constitution. . . .  [P]urpose rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens
liability on . . . an official charged with violations arising from his or her superintendent 
responsibilities”) (emphasis added).  Accord, e.g., Richards v. Pennsylvania, 196 Fed. App’x 82, 
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85 (3d Cir. 2006) (agreeing that plaintiff’s “failure to allege personal involvement on the part of 
defendant proved fatal to [plaintiff’s] claims”).  Accordingly, the allegations that Defendants 
acted collectively, or that other non-defendants acted under their collective direction and control, 
also fail to state plausible claims for relief.  
V. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Finally, this Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations do not plausibly establish that the 
Defendants knowingly violated their clearly established rights.  Accordingly, the doctrine of 
qualified immunity protects them “from undue interference with their duties and from potentially 
disabling threats of liability.” Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 514 (1994).  The doctrine 
applies unless Plaintiffs sufficiently plead that Defendants violated their “clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).  In accordance with this doctrine, government officials 
will be immune from suit in their individual capacities unless, “taken in the light most favorable 
to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a 
constitutional right” and “the right was clearly established” at the time of the objectionable 
conduct.  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).  “The relevant dispositive inquiry in 
determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable 
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.  
This inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case.”  Id. at 201.  
Accordingly, “to decide whether a right was clearly established, a court must consider the state 
of the existing law at the time of the alleged violation and the circumstances confronting the 
officer to determine whether a reasonable state actor could have believed his conduct was 
lawful.” Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010).  Courts may exercise 
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their discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be 
addressed first in consideration of the circumstances presented by the particular case at hand.  
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).   
It is well established that qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere 
defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously 
permitted to go to trial [or the defendant is compelled to undergo other burdens of litigation].”  
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis in original).  Therefore, “[w]here 
possible, qualified immunity should even protect officials from pretrial matters such as 
discovery, for ‘[i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.’”  
Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 130 (3d Cir.1986) (citations omitted). 
This Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that a reasonable ICE 
agent would believe that the conduct alleged in the Amended Complaint was unlawful.  Notably, 
while the Amended Complaint contains the legal conclusion that Defendants “unjustifiably” and 
“outrageously” included them on the working list of persons suspected to be illegal aliens, they 
themselves plead that the process of creating the final working list took Defendants more than 
one year to complete, during which ICE agents “exchanged various versions” of the information 
provided by the PPA on the original PPA list in “an effort to create a working list that identified 
illegal aliens or immigrants certified by PPA to operate taxicabs in Philadelphia.”  (Am. Compl. 
¶ 14.)  Furthermore, with regard to the allegations concerning the Defendants’ actions 
concerning the Plaintiffs’ mistaken inclusion on the working list, their alleged arrest, and their 
initial interrogations to determine their citizenship status, this Court notes that ICE agents are 
empowered with the statutory authority to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien 
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as to his right to be or to remain in the United States.  See 8 U.S.C. §  1357(a)(1).6  Thus, 
considered in the light most favorable to them, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead that 
reasonable ICE agents would believe that their year-long effort of identifying possible illegal 
alien taxicab drivers, and interrogating the persons so identified to determine their citizenship 
status, was unlawful.   Because qualified immunity “gives ample room for mistaken judgments” 
by protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” see
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986), this Court must conclude that the Defendants are 
entitled to qualified immunity for their actions in mistakenly placing the Plaintiffs on the 
working list, causing them to come to the PPA headquarters, and interrogating them regarding 
their immigration status.
This Court also concludes that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in their 
alleged conduct of continuing to detain the Plaintiffs after they had determined that they were 
citizens.7 Plaintiffs allege that they were kept at the PPA headquarters until the ICE operation
was concluded so that they could not tip off other taxicab drivers about the ICE operation.  
                                               
6The statute provides that: 
Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations prescribed 
by the Attorney General shall have power without warrant -- (1) to interrogate any 
alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the 
United States . . . . 
8 U.S.C. §  1357(a)(1). 
7The Amended Complaint fails to allege with specificity the amount of time each 
Plaintiff was actually detained after his citizenship status was confirmed. While Plaintiffs 
alleges that they were detained “for several additional hours,” they only allege the time that each 
Plaintiff arrived at the PPA headquarters, not the times that their citizenship statuses were each 
determined, or the time they were actually permitted to leave.  This Court notes that each 
Plaintiff was apparently present at the PPA headquarters for different amounts of time since each 
arrived at different times.  For example, while the letters advised the recipients to arrive at 9:30 
(see Am. Compl. Ex. A, B), Plaintiff Shittu alleges he arrived at 7:00 a.m. (Am. Compl. ¶ 21), 
Plaintiff Bounthisane arrived at 9:00 a.m. (id. ¶ 53), and Plaintiff Lawal arrived at 9:30 a.m. (Id.
¶ 85.)  
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Although Plaintiffs characterize the continued detention as conscience-shocking, they do not 
allege or argue that the Defendants’ stated purpose for keeping them at the PPA headquarters 
until the operation concluded was not legitimate.  While this Court deeply sympathizes with 
Plaintiffs having to wait for some additional time after their citizenship had been established, the 
Supreme Court has counseled that “[t]here is, of course, a de minimis level of imposition with 
which the Constitution is not concerned.”  Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977); see 
also United States v. Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206, 1212 n.7 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Of trifles the law 
does not concern itself: De minimis non curat lex.”); Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 245, 248 (7th Cir. 
1996) (Posner, J.) (outlining the contours of de minimis intrusions that do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment).  While they claim they were required to remain, to remain seated, and to not 
speak, Plaintiffs do not allege that once their citizenship status was confirmed that they were 
thereafter handcuffed or treated in the same manner as those determined to be illegal aliens.
Plaintiff Lawal alleges that those who were determined to be legally present were provided with 
food and drink while they waited.  This Court finds that, considered in the light most favorable to 
them, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead that reasonable ICE agents would believe that 
the minimal intrusion of requiring the Plaintiffs to remain, remain seated, and refrain from 
talking until after the operation was concluded, was unreasonable or unlawful.  Accordingly, 
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for this conduct as well.
 For these reasons, this Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.  An appropriate 
order follows.8
                                               
8Because Plaintiffs have already had the opportunity to amend their complaint in the face 
of the same arguments raised by Defendants in the instant Motion to Dismiss, and failed to 
correct the defects identified by Defendants and found valid herein, this Court finds no cause to 
grant Plaintiffs an additional opportunity to amend their pleading. 
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